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Forthcoming: 20:1 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES (2013)
ABSTRACT
This paper explores, in an inevitably cursory manner, some of the main challenges facing a legal
theory of transnational governance today. In part building on and responding to William
Twining’s identification of key problems of law in a global context (2009; 2012), the following
paper adopts a two-fold approach. One element is to suggest a conceptual architecture, which
captures law in its transformational state through a focus on actors, norms, and processes.
Second, the paper proposes case studies as a central methodological device to explore the
nature, scope, and function of governance—both legal and nonlegal—in a global context.
Through the identification of cases in global governance such as, but not limited to, examples of
human rights violations around multinational engagements in developing countries or conflicts
between indigenous peoples and the rights governing the extraction industry, as well as the role
of nonstate actors in financial regulation, the essay engages with the structural and institutional
changes that characterize legal regulation in a transnational context today. The paper posits the
significance of identifying links between newly emerging, transnational cases and seminal cases
from the nation-state experience in order to trace the continuance of dilemmas arising out of
tough questions, old wounds, and hard cases. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in
Lochner v. New York serves as backdrop and reference for pertinent, but increasingly
challenged approaches to the identification of interests and rights in a social conflict.
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I. GLOBALIZATION AND THE LAW: HOW MANY UNKNOWNS?
Compared to even just about ten or fifteen years ago, when scholars in law, sociology, or
political science were able to list the term globalization among their research and teaching
interests on their websites, today such announcements would likely strike us as quite naive.
Despite the fact that globalization remains a term that continues to invite uncounted definitions
and demarcations,1 for most scholars it has become less of a self-sufficient label to describe their
research undertaking than a denotation of not only the context in which, but also a perspective
from which a particular societal constellation is being addressed. This process of addressing a
situation, a problem, or a challenge, however, already involves an act of selection, identification,
and construction. It happens through the employment of analytical tools and instruments, through
conceptual frameworks, and through particular forms and methods of organizing tools and
frameworks to produce results. For a number of social sciences, in particular for law, sociology,2
political science,3 certain strands of economics,4 anthropology,5 and political philosophy,6 as
well as economic and social geography,7 globalization has led to a considerable complexification
of the conceptual and disciplinary frameworks within which questions are being asked, data is
being collected, and theories are being developed. In other words, globalization has a formidable
function as it continues to be such a multifaceted “unknown,” unfolding primarily through its
short-circuiting of different disciplinary analyses and through its bringing together of previously
demarcated issue areas and frameworks.
Today, law, as a discipline, theory, and practice can hardly be imagined outside of this
context. Central to globalization’s powerful impact on law is its radical challenge to the nexus
between state and law, that is a challenge to the assumption that law emanates from authoritative,
institutionalized processes grounded in a state-based system of norm creation, implementation,

1

For a helpful orientation, see generally, JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON, GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT
HISTORY (Dona Geyer trans., 2005) (2003); MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
(2003); Saskia Sassen, Globalization or Denationalization?, 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1 (2003).
2
See generally ULRICH BECK, WORLD AT RISK (Ciaran Cronin trans., Polity Press 2009) (2007); SASKIA SASSEN, A
SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION (2007).
3
See generally Michael Zürn, Globalization and Global Governance: From Societal to Political Denationalization,
11 EUR. REV. 341 (2003).
4
See generally BRUNO AMABLE ET AL., LES SYSTÈMES D'INNOVATION: À L'ÈRE DE LA GLOBALISATION
[INNOVATION SYSTEMS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION] (1997) (Fr.); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS (2002); Daniel Berkowitz, et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR.
ECON. REV. 165 (2003); Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 347 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
5
See generally ADDA B. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD (1971); PARTHA
CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD
(2004); Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357
(1992); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L.
REV. 973 (2005).
6
See generally SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM (Robert Post ed., 2006); THOMAS POGGE, WORLD
POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2008); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2002).
7
See generally David Harvey, The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations, 18 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE &
SOC’Y 211 (2005); Paul Krugman, What’s New About the New Economic Geography?, 14 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 7 (1998).
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and adjudication.8 It is this nexus that has come under broad scrutiny, a development that finds
expression in numerous iterations under titles such as Legal Order in a Global World9, Global
Legal Pluralism10, or Transnational Law.11 Notwithstanding their analytical and conceptual
function, such frameworks are often accused of still failing to provide definitive answers as to
the actual form, institutional structure, and relevance of law. In other words, attempts by lawyers
to make sense of the globalization of law continue to struggle with competing contentions
regarding the question whether law should be seen as a victim and as collateral damage of an
otherwise all-encompassing power that overwhelms and subdues nationally existing legal
orders,12 or as a transformation science, through which the continuing differentiation processes
of modern society can become manifest.13 Particularly the proliferation of private norm making,
which is the creation of legally binding rules outside of the institutional, state-based systems of
rule setting,14 has lead to a forceful accentuation of this dilemma.15 Seen against the background
of the law-as-victim thesis, the ubiquitous forms of private ordering, both inside and outside of
8

For a comprehensive engagement with this challenge, see WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL
THEORY (2000). See also Neil Walker, Out of Place and Out of Time: Law's Fading Co-ordinates, 14 EDINBURGH
L. REV. 13 (2010).
9
See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485
(2005); Ulrich Sieber, Rechtliche Ordnung in einer Globalen Welt [Legal Order in a Global World], 41
RECHTSTHEORIE [THEORY OF JUSTICE] 151 (2010).
10
See PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012);
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2006); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009).
11
See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); ALFRED AMAN JR. & PEER ZUMBANSEN,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: ACTORS, NORMS, PROCESSES (forthcoming 2013); Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and
Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions, in 2 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 19 (Norbert Horn & Clive M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982); Christian
Tietje & Karsten Nowrot, Laying Conceptual Ghosts of the Past to Rest: The Rise of Philip C. Jessup's
'Transnational Law' in the Regulatory Governance of the International Economic System, in PHILIP C. JESSUP’S
TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVISITED: ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS PUBLICATION 17 (Christian
Tietje et al. eds., 2006); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 898 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012).
12
Consider the parallels between this scenario and that drawn up by Carl Schmitt with regard to the state falling
victim to society, an approach powerfully taken up by one of his most gifted pupils, Ernst Forsthoff. See Ernst
Forsthoff, The Administration as Provider of Services, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 326 (Arthur J.
Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 2000). For more background,
see Thomas Vesting, Die Sprengkraft des Heterogenen: Über Karl-Heinz Ladeurs Entwurf einer post-modernen
Rechtstheorie [The Explosive Power of the Heterogenous Concept: On Karl-Heinz Ladeur’s Design of a PostModern Legal Theory], 81 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE [ARCHIVE FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY] 92 (1995) (Ger.); Ilse Staff, Die Wahrung staatlicher Ordnung: Ein Beitrag zum technologischen
Staat und seinen rechten Propheten Carl Schmitt und Ernst Forsthoff [The Maintenance of Governmental Order: A
Contribution to the Technological State and its Right-Wing Prophets Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff], 15
LEVIATHAN 141 (1987) (discussing the consequences of the concept of State under the increasingly dominant impact
of modern technology, focusing on whether and how the threat to individual fundamental right positions within the
technological State can be countered via its constitution) (Ger.).
13
See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, The King's Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy, 31 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 763 (1997); Marc Amstutz, Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary Jurisprudence, 9
GERMAN L.J. 465 (2008).
14
See generally TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011).
15
For early examples of highly insightful analysis, see THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
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the nation state, are regularly read as—further—signs of the erosion processes, which allegedly
characterize the general fate of the sovereign state in the global era and are now seen to find a
particularly striking illustration in the relativization of the state’s authority to administer and to
control the institutions of norm creation.16 The emerging transnational landscape soon becomes a
treacherous minefield of competing contestations brought forward by traditional and
nontraditional actors.17 In a context that is characterized on the one hand by the significant entry
of nonstate actors onto the transnational regulatory sphere, raising pertinent concerns regarding
legitimacy and representation,18 and on the other hand by an important role still played by state
regulatory institutions,19 the demarcation of spheres of influences,20 the identification of
sources—as well as centers and peripheries—of power,21 or the mapping of newly emerging
structures and spaces of global sovereignty,22 present formidable challenges, which can
adequately be confronted only through an interdisciplinary analysis. Such an approach must
ambitiously draw together historical and conceptual work in law, political science, sociology,
anthropology, geography, and economics in an attempt to grasp the various voices and
trajectories of analysis pertaining to the inchoate global order. In recent years, the label “global
governance” has been applied to relating, complementing, and intersecting theoretical
endeavours on the one hand, and to very real institutional transformations and policy
implementations on the other. While scholars of different shades and colors engage in
substituting globalization studies with ambitious analytical frameworks dedicated to study
“global governance,”23 the latter has long been a central reference point in global policy making

16

For a differentiated discussion of the continuing role of state function in a transformed landscape of international
relations, see GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau
& Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); SASSEN, supra note 2 at 45-96.
17
For pertinent assessments from the perspective of public international law, see generally Luis Eslava & Sundhya
Pahuja, Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 103
(2011); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing Resistance, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397 (2003).
18
For critical assessments, see, for example, A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY:
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). For a persuasive critique of this position, see Paul Schiff
Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX L. REV. 1265 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra); Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1404 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra).
19
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Future of Global Governance, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED:
TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 309 (Narcis Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
20
See ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000) (exploring such demarcation).
21
For a post-“dependency theory” assessment of center/peripheriry tensions in global governance, historically
associated with scholars such as Johan Galtung, e.g., Johan Galtung, A Structural Theory of Imperialism, 8 J. Peace
Res. 81 (1971), and Immanuel Wallerstein, e.g., IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: AN
INTRODUCTION (2004), see Craig Calhoun, Cosmopolitanism and Hegemony, in DEMOKRATIE IN DER
WELTGESELLSCHAFT [DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD SOCIETY] 17 (Hauke Brunkhorst ed., 2009) (Ger.).
22
See Saskia Sassen, The Places and Spaces of the Global: An Expanded Analytic Terrain, in GLOBALIZATION
THEORY 79 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2007).
23
See GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD ORDER (Meghnad Desai & Paul Redfern
eds.,1995); RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE,
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of
Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405 (2006); Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World:
Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 (2011).
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and in the exercise of institutional power.24 This congruence between scholarly imagination and
conceptualization, on the one hand, and the actual institutional transformation on the other,
prompts a follow-up question regarding the ability of the former to critically analyze and
investigate the latter. In other words, the theoretical-conceptual work, pursued by a fast-growing
group of scholars who are bringing their respective globally acquired expertise to bear on
interdisciplinary collaboration, ethnographic fieldwork, and data mining,25 needs to pass muster
when it comes to assessing these studies’ sensitivity to the politics at the heart of these “global
transformations.”26
With the landscape of law’s engagement with globalization thus sketched, the next task
appears to be a more concrete one. In Part II, this paper reviews some pertinent disciplinary
approaches to the study and analysis of transnational governance constellations, selectively and
very cursorily considering law, political science, political philosophy, sociology, anthropology,
geography, and history. Part III will suggest a number of translation categories between the
national and the transnational legal imagination. In response to what seems to be a difficult
choice either between a story of loss of law (of legal certainty, unity, and coherence) vis-à-vis the
globalization of law or a story of the stubborn transposition of legal concepts developed on the
national level onto the global one, the categories suggested here—actors, norms, and
processes27—are drawn on in a attempt to highlight not only the links and continuities, but also
the disruptions between national and transnational legal-regulatory configurations. That section
will also engage with the framing concepts of jurisdiction and scale in order to highlight how
governance conflicts are regularly disembedded by confining them to a particular context,
governed by rules of competence and authority. The final section, Part IV, will return to the
Lochner decision to discuss what possible lessons could be drawn today for present efforts to
conceptualize transnational governance constellations. It is here where not only the links to, but
also the differences between, cases such as Lochner and some of the emerging problem
constellations become most evident. To the degree that the latter confront us with a complex
array of interests, stakes, vulnerabilities, and entitlements of which the act of articulating,
making visible, and judicializing is embedded in a particularly volatile situation marked by
competing claims to institutional and normative authority, the task, for Dworkin’s judge
Hercules,28 for example, of drawing the right lessons from previous case law will become even
more overwhelming.

24

See, e.g., RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO 2 (2003) (“[G]lobal governance
institutions, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), might bring huge swathes of entire
continents under the same pernicious, undemocratic control.”).
25
For examples of recent studies, see ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011); ANNA LOWENHAUPT TSING, FRICTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL
CONNECTION (2005).
26
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE (David Held &
Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003).
27
See generally Aman & Zumbansen, supra note 11; Peer Zumbansen, The Future of Legal Theory, in THE LAW OF
THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 325 (Sam Muller et al. eds., 2011); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 738 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
28

See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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II. DISCIPLINARY EXHAUSTION AND THE “REAL WORLD”
Transnational governance has been emerging as both a phenomenon and a field, which
itself is constituted through an evolving and ambitious methodological agenda in response to a
fast-evolving regulatory landscape. Legal theorists, philosophers, and sociologists of law have
been prolific in attempting to ascertain the nature and scope of the challenges for law and
jurisprudence from transformations commonly associated with globalization. William Twining,
former Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London, has been one such
investigator into the prospects of law in today’s changed institutional and normative context. In
his scholarship he has long been a traveller between worlds, depicting with a keen mind and an
admirable sensibility the communication gaps that mark the space separating different legal
(political and economic) cultures,29 sketching the dimensions of legal doctrine’s engagement
with globalization,30 highlighting the necessity to shift perspectives and viewpoints;31 to
tirelessly revisit, reconsider; and to reassess the insights we have been gaining along this
unpredictable path.32 Meanwhile, Twining has been a fervent advocate of the need to keep legal
education, curricular reform, and law school innovation in close touch with these theoretical
developments.33 In his 2009 Montesquieu lectures delivered at Tilburg Law School, building on
his most recent major work, General Jurisprudence,34 he masterfully drew these different strands
together and formulated an overseeable and yet highly complex list of challenges “identified
inductively in over ten years of thinking about globalisation and law and general
jurisprudence.”35 These challenges merit being reproduced here as they identify some of the
central concerns of legal theory in the context of globalization in remarkable succinctness.
Twining notes that:
• “the whole Western tradition of academic law is based on several kinds of assumptions
that need to be critically examined in a changing context;
• we lack concepts, and data to generalise about legal phenomena in the worlds as a whole:
analytic concepts that can transcend, at least to some extent, different legal traditions and
cultures;
• comparison is the first step to generalisation and more sophisticated and expansive
approaches to comparative law are critical for the development of a healthy discipline of
law;
• we need more sophisticated normative theories that are well-informed and sensitive to
pluralism of beliefs and differences between value systems; and,
especially, we need improved empirical understandings of how legal doctrines,
institutions and practices operate in the ‘real world.’”36
While it is not possible in the narrow confines of the present paper to even attempt to do
justice to the program of research, inquiry, and imagination Twining sets out for us, we may still
29

See William Twining, Other People's Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997, 63 BROOK L.
REV. 189 (1997).
30
See TWINING, supra note 8.
31
See HUMAN RIGHTS, SOUTHERN VOICES (William Twining ed., 2009).
32
See WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009).
33
See TWINING, supra note 8, at 257-263.
34
TWINING, supra note 32.
35
WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 36 (2011).
36
Id. at 37 (bullet points added).
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want to underline the complexity of the constellation he identifies. His assessment of unchecked,
yet influential assumptions, lacking analytic concepts, of the need to elaborate an adequately
sophisticated theory of comparative legal studies and of more sophisticated normative theories
reflects a sovereign grasp of a multilayered and difficult-to-grasp problem. But, this ambitious
theoretical-intellectual agenda is accompanied by, and grounded and embedded in, a passionate
call for improved empirical understandings of the real world workings of legal doctrines,
institutions, and practices. What is striking in Twining’s identification of the work to be done is,
above all, the humility and caution with which the program is being formulated, which is why his
depiction of law’s challenges is so useful in setting the stage for a contemporary assessment of
how law itself, and in exchange with other disciplines, sets its sails for this journey. There is,
indeed, much to be humble and cautious about. The emerging and quickly overwhelming world
of transnational governance needs to be treated as more than a new playground for well-worn
and established rules, principles, and order concepts. Instead, law is very much faced with a
multiplication of cases, which are characterized by a nontraditional quality of the actors, norms,
and processes to which legal authority as well as legal rules have been associated.37 But, as
Twining notes, there is not much security to be had in a world where lawyers (and others)
witness the erosion of dearly held distinctions such as public/private, state/non-state, and even
law/non-law, prompting them to contemplate “law’s fading coordinates.”38 Que faire, in such a
situation?
While the four challenges identified above are pertinent in directing our attention to the
undone theoretical and conceptual work, the fifth one—improved empirical understandings of
how legal doctrines, institutions, and practices operate in the real world—is key. In the search for
an analytical framework for law in this new, transnational landscape of new actors, norms, and
processes, it is improved empirical understandings that hark back to a dimension of law
intimately linking the old and the new, the national and the transnational, and the global.
Twining’s pointer to law’s operations in the real world is sensitive to the longstanding concerns
among perceptive observers as well as real world inhabitants with law’s and lawyers’ blindsidedness regarding the impact and consequences of legal decisions (or, of their absence). Taken
up, predominantly, by legal sociologists,39 criminologists,40 or legal anthropologists,41 the
disregard of law and its personnel for the temporality and effect of law’s operation42 is a crucial
component of any attempt to ground and to contextualize law and its role and its relation to
society.43 An insight from these engagements that carries particular significance for today’s
37

See HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS (Thomas Hale & David
Held eds., 2011) (bringing together individual studies on 51 distinct regulatory regimes in the area of transnational
governance).
38
See Marc Amstutz, The Letter of the Law: Legal Reasoning in a Societal Perspective, 10 GERMAN L.J. 361
(2009); Walker, supra note 8.
39
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
40
See, e.g., MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003).
41
See, e.g., SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978).
42
See generally Austin Sarat, Vitality Amidst Fragmentation: On the Emergence of Postrealist Law and Society
Scholarship, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (tracing the
development of the study of law and society).
43
See generally, MARIANA VALVERDE, EVERYDAY LAW ON THE STREET: CITY GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF
DIVERSITY (2012) (evaluating the role of law in city governance on both a local and global scale); John Paterson &
Gunther Teubner, Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis, 7 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 451 (1998) (outlining an
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efforts in demarcating law’s role in a context of disembeddedness is that conceptual elaborations
of law must remain closely connected to an evolving methodology to test theoretical assumptions
and presuppositions.44 This goes some way in explaining the degree to which today’s legal
sociological and legal anthropological scholarship on law and globalization is adamant about
identifying and monitoring possible patterns of neglect, exclusion, and omission in connection to
some models of global law, as they rapidly become fashionable. The critical response by scholars
working within the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) realm,45 to the
proposal of Global Administrative Law46 is noteworthy in this regard,47 as is the scrutiny of the
recent turn to indicators48 by global governance institutions such as the World Bank.49
A. The Treacherous Promise of Distinctions
Besides these mentioned theoretical and legal-sociological contentions, law’s responses
to global governance have been mobilizing some well-established frameworks. In that vein, we
can perceive an intriguing echo of public and private law perspectives, from which lawyers aim
to disentangle the confusing web of new institutions, hard/soft law, and nontraditional processes
of rule making. From a public law perspective, discontents have been highlighting, for example,
the political outcomes and costs of the post-9/11 regulation of civil rights and liberties,50 of the
Iraq War and the surrounding doubts as to its legality,51 and of the enduringly negative impacts
approach to developing an empirical understanding of legal autopoiesis); Peer Zumbansen, Law’s Knowledge and
Law’s Effectiveness: Reflections from Legal Sociology and Legal Theory, 10 GERMAN L.J. 417 (2009) (discussing
the present and future state of legal sociology and theory).
44
See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 507 (1977) (analyzing the fact that contract law has developed theoretical foundations based on
litigation despite the fact that few contract disputes are resolved via litigation); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (analyzing the role that occupation plays in
determining the amount of planning and legal action that takes place in the context of business). See also Marc
Galanter, In the Winter of Our Discontent: Law, Anti-Law, and Social Science, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2006)
(critiquing what the author perceives to be a prevailing, and unjustified, negativity towards the law).
45
For background, see, for example, James Thuo Gathii, Third World Approaches to International Economic
Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE 255 (Richard Falk et al. eds.,
2008); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory,
Methodology, or Both?, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371 (2008).
46
See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15 (2005) (identifying the new field of Global Administrative Law and proposing next steps for its
development).
47
See generally B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 799 (2005) (evaluating the effect of Global Administrative Law from a third world perspective).
48
This is, of course, a variation of David Kennedy’s magisterial treatment of international institutional development.
David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987).
49
See generally GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE WORLD
BANK (2012) (evaluating the marginalization of human rights concerns within the World Bank); Merry, supra note
23 (exploring the use of indicators as representations of complex phenomena for the purposes of global governance).
50
See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004) (exploring the political reactions to exceptional events, particularly those of
September 11, 2001).
51
See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Interpreting the Fall of a Monument, 4 GERMAN L.J. 701 (2003) (evaluating whether
positive outcomes justify what the author believes to be an illegal war); Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of
Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 395 (2005)
(discussing changes in international law expanding a nation’s right to preemptive self-defense); Ed Morgan,
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of failing trade and climate control negotiations.52 Meanwhile, from a private law perspective, a
lot of attention regarding the emerging transnational landscape has focused on the effects of
wide-ranging privatization and transnationalization processes of core areas of social regulation.53
In response to a movement that had its origin in the decline of Western welfare-state regulatory
governance,54 and eventually attained a global dimension through the Washington Consensus’
mandate of deregulation and privatization,55 private law scholars have drawn on the insights of
sociologists and anthropologists to effectively illuminate the nature and role of legal regulation
in the fast-expanding regimes, now referred to as “transnational private regulatory
governance.”56
B. Social Norms Lurking Beneath Law’s Floorboards
We can discern echoes of previous contentions not only as regards the regulatory area
from where such voices make themselves heard: in other words, the intricate connections that
can be discerned between global regulatory discourses and their alleged forerunners in the
nation-state are not limited to the recurrence of institutional or procedural transformations such
as those which we can identify through the lenses of deregulation and privatization.57 Perhaps
even more important for a better understanding of the connections between such globally and
nationally occurring institutional transformations are their consequences for the surrounding
regulatory environment. This can be illustrated by adopting a term central in two realms: first, in
the current private law imagination of globalization, and second, in the legal-political
imagination within the nation-state. The term in question is “social norms.” Social norms are

Slaughterhouse-Six: Updating the Law of War, 5 GERMAN L.J. 525 (2004) (exploring the legal debate surrounding
the Iraq War).
52
See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX (2011) (arguing for a new regime of globalization
enabling greater cooperation among nations in trade negotiations with added protection for individual nations);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE METHOD OF
ECONOMICS 7-24 (2007) (identifying many problems with modern attempts at reaching trade agreements and the
inefficiencies that have resulted); Lorand Bartels, Trade and Human Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 571, 578-83 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) (analyzing the costs of trade
agreements with regard to human rights).
53
See, e.g., ROGER BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUCCI, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR STANDARDS: THE SOFT LAW
TRACK (2004) (evaluating the effects of transnationalization processes on labor standards); Adelle Blackett, Codes
of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Regulatory State in Developing Countries, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW 121
(John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004) (analyzing the impact of nongovernmental organizations on the
development of international labor regulations); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global
Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 611 (2005) (discussing the role of private
standard setters in financial markets and the possibility of, and opportunity for, democratic control of such standard
setters).
54
For insightful depictions and narratives, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WELFARE STATE (John
Bednarz Jr. trans., Walter de Gruyter 1990) (1981); Gunther Teubner, Regulatory Law: Chronicle of a Death
Foretold, 1 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 451 (1992).
55
See THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 19;
David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12
(2005).
56
See generally Symposium, The Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional
Debates, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 1 (2011) (discussing and debating the foundations, norms, and problems of transnational
private regulation).
57
The analysis provided by Ulrich Sieber, supra note 9, is very helpful in this regard.
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being referred to in both national contract,58 and transnational lex mercatoria (law merchant),59
discourses when it comes to discerning the primacy of actors’ self-regulatory capacities on the
one hand and the necessity to keep an intervening, overbearing judiciary and state apparatus at
bay, on the other. It must be noted that an interest in social norms as instantiations of societal
self-governance harks back to earliest work carried out by pioneers in sociology of law, legal
pluralism,60 and administrative law,61 long before becoming a token in a polemical argument
against state interventionism and free markets. But it is through the parallel reading of the claims
for uninhibited contractual governance without contract law within (nation-state based) debates
over “incompetent courts,”62 and those for an autonomous legal order in the transnational
sphere,63 that we can see more clearly the politics attached to these assertions. It is here where
transnational governance, too often depicted mainly as a mere description of an increasingly
complex institutional set-up, is arriving politically. Only through such a parallel reading and the
short-circuiting of deregulation and privatization discourses as they unfold on the national and
the transnational, or global, level is it possible to grasp the challenges facing a (political) legal
theory of global governance.
C. Fear of Falling
Compressed into a relatively small space we can discern some of the central challenges to
current legal thinking: under the impression of an unquestionably deep-running transformation of
forms of public and private ordering in many of the West’s highly industrialized states, lawyers
seek to discern the contours of the new, transnational context in which these developments must
be seen today. What they find are impressive accounts of globalization processes that prompt a
great number of social science disciplines to fundamentally rethink their analytical categories
and conceptual frameworks. In this context, legal scholars find that their own accounts of the
growing limits of regulatory capacity in view of border crossing environmental or security
concerns, for example, coalesce with observations made by political scientists, sociologists,
geographers, or anthropologists regarding a fundamental decentralization and privatization of
norm creation and legal-political decision making. For law, to be sure, there is much at stake, as
this multidisciplinary diagnosis strongly points to the need for lawyers to rethink the proper
foundations, boundaries and—in fact—the nature of their object itself. In other words, the rich
accounts of legal pluralism and nonstate based norm creation, which are central to current
58

See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54
U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2004).
59
See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010) (analyzing the
practical consequences of legal theories underlying international arbitration).
60
See, e.g., EUGEN EHRLICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1913) (Ger.), translated in EUGENE
EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter L. Moll trans., Russell & Russell 1962)
(outlining the beginnings of a sociological approach to the law).
61
See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937) (exploring the ability of
interested private groups to influence the development of law). For an excellent engagement with Jaffe’s approach to
administrative governance, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings of
Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997).
62
See POSNER, supra note 58, at 158.
63
See, e.g., GAILLARD, supra note 59 (arguing in favor of the practice of allowing transnational actors to choose
their form of dispute resolution); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX
MERCATORIA (2d ed. 2010) (tracing the codification of developing autonomous global and transnational economic
law and the effects resulting from such codification).
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depictions of the shift from government to governance,64 can be read as strong signals that law
itself has an identity crisis, a crisis regarding its own nature and function.65 We have already
seen, however, that such depictions of, effectively, a co-existence of legal and nonlegal forms of
social regulation and of a complex overlap of public and private spheres of societal rule making,
are part of the central make-up of legal theory, as it evolves over time. That merits mention,
particularly in a context where assertions regarding the difficulties associated with such inchoate
regulatory landscapes are frequently linked to both acknowledgments of proliferating private
governance actors on the one hand and sometimes acquiescent recognitions of the exhaustion of
state regulatory power, on the other.66
D. The Tools We Have Available, Just in Case We Need Them
The following stocktaking of different disciplines’ approaches to and imaginations of
transnational governance can at best be cursory. Its function is, however, to point to some of the
governing conceptions and preoccupations inherent to those disciplines that have been at the
forefront of reorienting their analytical and conceptual frameworks in response to transnational
governance phenomena. Among the disciplines briefly considered here are law, political science,
sociology, anthropology, geography, and history. Aware of the pitfalls of such cursory
stocktaking, we can only point to some questions pursued within these disciplines with regard to
global governance challenges.
For law in a global context, perhaps the key question has been: Can there be law beyond
the state? This highlights the state’s prominence in the twentieth century and Western legal
imagination,67 with a related question being: How does the state’s role on the national level68
compare to that on an international one?69 And, which role should be attributed to newly
emerging actors?70 The state/law nexus has far-reaching consequences and predetermines the
64

A fascinating overview of fast-proliferating issue-areas and transnational regulatory regimes is offered in THE
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS, supra note 37.
65
See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 10 (exploring the difficulties caused by the many different intersecting bodies of
law and regulation, particularly on interstate actors).
66
For critical engagement with such assertions, see H.W. Arthurs, The Administrative State Goes to Market (and
Cries 'Wee, Wee, Wee' All the Way Home), 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 797 (2005); Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and
Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO
L.J. 853 (2005).
67
See generally JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995) (analyzing how the concept of
sovereignty has played a central role in the development of transnational relations and theories of international law);
Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1 (1999) (addressing the negative effects that the concept of sovereignty has had in international relations).
68
See generally THOMAS RISS-KAPPEN, COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES: THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (1995) (evaluating the ways in which foreign states exert influence over one another’s national
policies through alliances); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (1996) (analyzing the declining influence of the state in light of the rise of non-state actors); Mark
Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 40 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (evaluating states’ attempts to restructure government through privatization
and outsourcing); Carol Harlow, The 'Hidden Paw' of the State and the Publicisation of Private Law, in A SIMPLE
COMMON LAWYER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL TAGGART 75 (David Dyzenhaus et al. eds., 2009) (discussing
the reaction of national administrative law to the emerging influence of globalization).
69
See generally THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et
al. eds., 1999).
70
See generally Philip Alston, The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime
Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Philip Alston ed., 2005)
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context and analytic force of conceptual distinctions, such as state/non-state, law/‘non-law’, and
national/global. A well-known example is the transnational law merchantt with its largely selfregulatory arbitration regimes.71 More recent debates over the scope and function of a global
constitutional legal order risk re-inscribing the state/law question among optimists,72 skeptics,73
and fragmentationists.74 For political science and political philosophy, since Hobbes, the
question of the nature and consequences of a transformation of sovereignty has been central.
Mobilizing concepts such as state,75 (international) organization,76 regimes,77 and sovereignty,78
political science debates often fruitfully carve out the methodological challenge for a discipline
incorporating a world of increased institutional fluidity and normative heterarchy into its
(elucidating the difficulty that arises in incorporating non-state actors into a transnational legal framework, as well
as the problem of defining such actors by what they are not).
71
See generally A. CLAIRE CUTLER, supra note 18; Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et 'lex mercatoria’,
[Boundaries of Law and ‘Lex Mercatoria’]13 ARCHIVES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT [ARCHIVES OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] 177 (1964); Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History
as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2008) (tracing the history, and
outlining the shape, of lex mercatoria); Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, 2
CURRENT L. & SOC. PROBS. 129 (1961); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and
Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1997) (evaluating the complimentary and competing functions of lex
mercatoria and more traditional forms of law); Zumbansen, supra note 11.
72
See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6
INT’L J. CONST. L. 415 (2008) (arguing that a global legal order might be achieved from the many applicable legal
structures by relaxing hierarchy and embracing inevitable inconsistency).
73
See, e.g., Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397 (2009)
(addressing common criticisms of global constitutionalism and suggesting that it has significant merit); Alexander
Somek, Die Verfassung im Zeitalter ihrer transnationalen Reproduzierbarkeit: Gedanken zum Begriff der
Konstitutionalisierung [The Constitution in an Age of Its Transnational Reproductability: Throughts on the Concept
of Constitutionalism], in STRUKTURFRAGEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION [STRUCTURAL QUESTIONS FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION] 135 (Franzius et al. eds., 2011) (Ger.); Jeremy Waldron, Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-87, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722771 (expressing doubt about the general usefulness of constitutionalism as
a legal theory).
74
See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in
the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004) (outlining the consequences of a shift in the
global legal regime from being centered on moralistic norms to a more fragmented system of competing regimes);
Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 327 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010) (identifying the fragmentation resulting
from the emergence of private regulation and globalization and proposing solutions for states).
75
See generally R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY (1993); Léon
Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1917) (analyzing the role of the state in the development of
public law and questioning whether there is any higher organizing principle).
76
See generally José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324 (2006)
(tracing the legal history and transnational role of international organizations); Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard
Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT’L ORG. 753 (1986) (analyzing
the disconnect between the vibrancy of the study of international organizations and their relative weakness in
practice).
77
See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (analyzing the structures and roles of
international regimes).
78
See generally BARTELSON, supra note 67 (analyzing how the concept of sovereignty has played a central role in
the development of transnational relations and theories of international law); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER (2004) (arguing that transnational law should reflect a new world order in which sovereignty is
subservient to “government networks”); Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48
(1992) (proposing the redrawing of borders to decrease the likelihood of interstate conflict).
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analytical framework.79 Sociologists, locating society at the center of their analysis, have
highlighted the historical contingency of the state in what really should be a study of societal
evolution.80 Through institutional analysis sociologists have contributed concepts such as
institution, organization, territory, and space to depict the central dynamics of societal
transformation today,81 tracing an evolution from territorially confined political communities to
spatial “assemblages.”82 Such studies are further invigorated by fruitful tensions between
concepts of spatially reconfigured spheres of community and power,83 and depictions of a
functionally differentiated (world) society.84 This widening of the analytical lens invites studies
on how overarching structures of society are reproduced through daily practice in remarkably
diverse localities.85 Anthropologists engage in close studies of behaviors, attitudes, and actions
on the ground,86 confronting human rights theory87 and taking the new technicalities of global
79

See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009)
(proposing a new model of governance in order to account for the growing effects of nongovernmental actors);
Kenneth W. Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 9
(2005) (suggesting a joining of international relations theory and international law into a new unified legal
discipline); Mathias Albert & Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, Antinomien der Global Governance: Mehr Weltstaatlichkeit,
weniger Demokratie? [Antimony of Global Governance: More World-Statehood, less Democracy], in DEMOKRATIE
IN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT [DEMOCRACIES IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY], supra note 21, at 57; Adrienne Héritier &
Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y 1 (2008) (evaluating
the interplay of sectoral governance, or private regulation, and government policymaking); Christian Reus-Smit, The
Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT’L ORG. 555
(1997) (analyzing the effects of issue-specific regulatory bodies on the structure of international regulation and
policymaking).
80
See, e.g., Niklas Luhmann, Metamorphosen des Staates [Metamorphoses of the State], in
GESELLSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR UND SEMANTIK: STUDIEN ZUR WISSENSSOZIOLOGIE DER MODERNEN
GESELLSCHAFT [SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SEMANTICS: STUDIES ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE BY THE
MODERN COMMUNITY] 101 (1995) (Ger.); Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, 8 INT’L J. GEN.
SYS. 131 (1982) [hereinafter The World Society ] (U.K.).
81
See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998) (giving a broad overview of the author’s
perspective on the modern global economy); David Harvey, The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations, 18
INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 211 (2005) (discussing the role of geography and sociology in a modern
conceptualization of the world); John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144
(1997) (demarcating the role of the nation-state in global interactions); Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization,
5 INTERVENTIONS 241 (2003) (U.K.).
82
See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006)
(characterizing globalization as “denationalization” and describing the declining power of states in the face of rising
transnational institutions).
83
See, e.g.,Sassen, supra note 22; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum and the Global Left, 36
POL. & SOC’Y 247 (2008) (discussing the development of the World Social Forum and its contribution to the theory
and practice of Left movements throughout the world).
84
See, e.g., HELMUT WILLKE, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2006); The World Society, supra note 80.
85
See generally CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1989); ISSA G. SHIVJI, WHERE IS UHURU? REFLECTIONS ON THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
20-29 (Godwin R. Murunga ed., 2009); Cynthia Enloe, The Mundane Matters, 5 INT’L POL. SOC. 447 (2011); Xavier
Guillaume, The International as an Everyday Practice, 5 INT’L POL. SOC. 446, 446 (2011).
86
See, e.g., MARIANA VALVERDE, EVERYDAY LAW ON THE STREET: CITY GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY
(John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (undertaking a study of urban governance through a study of “everyday
law” in the “law-and-society” tradition); Carol J. Greenhouse, Fieldwork on Law, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 187
(2006) (considering multiple areas of scholarship across the disciplines of law and the social sciences); Mark B.
Salter, Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession, 1 INT’L POL. SOC. 49 (2007) (examining the
balance between mobility and security involved in governing and policing a Canadian international airport).
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governance such as indicators, performance yardsticks, and comparable governance
instruments,88 as empirical locations of new actor and norm creation, defying traditional
assertions of sovereignty. It is through such concrete engagements with regulatory dynamics and
power relations in complex societal settings that the abysses between northern and southern
epistemologies may be overcome.89 Finally, history and geography have been contributing
crucial insights into the dynamics and shapes of global governance constellations. Apart from the
already alluded-to social history approaches in the tradition of E.P. Thompson, a recent
theoretical and conceptual innovation is transnational history,90 which significantly expands the
conceptual scope of historical analysis in a context already demarcated transnational by
sociologists and legal scholars,91 but also poses grand questions for structures of power in the
global realm.92 Another important strand of historical scholarship has emerged from among the
group of scholars engaged in ‘subaltern studies’, focusing on a Foucauldian analysis of the
epistemic constructions of visions social (Utopian) orders in concrete historical and spatial
settings.93 This line of research fruitfully complements the way in which global governance
geographers have, since Montesquieu, studied social and economic dimensions, fruitfully
adapting geographical categories to contribute a nuanced appreciation of cartography, mapping,
and demarcation,94 with significant impact on sociological and legal research.95

87

See, e.g., Merry, supra note 5; Richard Ashby Wilson, Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights
and Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE
LOCAL 342 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007) (complementing an emphasis on the discursive and
social aspects of human rights by focusing on their legal character).
88
See SARFATY, supra note 49; Gerhard Anders, The Normativity of Numbers: World Bank and IMF Conditionality,
31 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 187 (2008); Andrea Ballestero S., Transparency Short-Circuited:
Laughter and Numbers in Costa Rican Water Politics, 35 PoLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 223 (2012);
Merry, supra note 23 (discussing the use of “indicators” as tools for assessing and promoting a variety of social
justice and reform strategies around the world).
89
See generally JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THEORY FROM THE SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-AMERICA IS
EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA (2012); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to
Ecologies of Knowledges, EUROZINE (June 29, 2007), http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2007-06-29-santos-en.pdf.
90
See, e.g., OSTERHAMMEL & PETERSSON, supra note 1; Sebastian Conrad, Globalization Effects: Mobility and
Nation in Imperial Germany, 1880-1914, 3 J. GLOBAL HIST. 43 (2008) (discussing the effects of globalization on the
trajectories of German nationalism in the nineteenth century); Jürgen Osterhammel, Transnationale
Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative? [Transnational Social History: Extension or Alternative?],
27 GESCHICHTE UND GESELLSCHAFT [HISTORY AND SOCIETY] 464 (2001) (Ger.).
91
See, e.g., JESSUP, supra note 11; THE TRANSNATIONAL STUDIES READER: INTERSECTIONS AND INNOVATIONS
(Sanjeev Khagram & Peggy Levitt eds., 2008).
92
See generally MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN IDEA, 1815 TO THE PRESENT
(2012).
93
Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley & Gyan Prakash, Introduction: Utopia and Dystopia beyond Space and Time, in
UTOPIA/DYSTOPIA. CONDITIONS OF HISTORICAL POSSIBILITY (Michael D. Gordin, Helen Tilley & Gyan Prakash
eds., 2010), at 4.
94
See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 81; Krugman, supra note 7 (reviewing the aspects of “new economic geography” as
a theoretical construct and new genre contributing to the study of economics).
95
See Joel Bakan & Nicholas Blomley, Spatial Categories, Legal Boundaries and the Judicial Mapping of the
Worker, 24 ENV’T & PLAN. 629 (1992); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L.
REV. 843 (1999) (arguing that territorial jurisdictions are new and surprising “technological developments” that
produce political and social identities); Gerald Frug, A Legal History of Cities, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER
154 (Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001); Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale:
Legal 'Technicalities’ as Resources for Theory, 18 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 139 (2009) (demonstrating that theoretical
work on “scale” can benefit from studying legal mechanisms such as “jurisdiction”).
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E. Boundaries and Confinements: The Effects of Scale & Jurisdiction
The interdisciplinary approach proposed here draws on methodological work to identify
analytical and regulatory challenges through the conceptualization of problem-driven research
frameworks.96 Examples of emerging research frameworks that seek to respond to complex
constellations in areas such as environmental or financial regulation include science and
technology studies, sustainability governance,97 global transformations,98 transnational
governance,99 and behavioral economics, which surfaced briefly,100 and revitalized after the 2008
financial crisis.101 Despite the respective breadth of these approaches, their contribution to theory
on law’s nature and function in the context of global governance has been limited. As argued
above, a focus on the triad of norms, actors, and processes may allow us to more adequately
theorize the emerging forms of law and regulatory governance in the context of a
transdisciplinary, context-sensitive analysis of emerging transnational governance constellations.
Methodologically, the approach proposed here is further inspired by the concepts of scale,
jurisdiction, and mapping, influentially theorized by the legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa
Santos and the criminologist Mariana Valverde. While, within legal discourse, scale demarcates
different levels of legal-political ordering (local, national, international, and global), jurisdiction
functions as a mapping of normative and institutional reach, demarcating spheres of
political/legal authority and competence.102 As such, the categories of scale and jurisdiction are
deeply invested in the construction and the mapping of a space of and for law, with significant
consequences for how claims and rights are recognized and administered.103
Scholars have long pointed to the political, constitutive effects of jurisdictional boundary
setting, thus giving rise to critiques of how spaces are created for the formulation (or denial) and
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mobilization (or obstruction) of legal rights.104 After critical geographers took up the challenge
of comparing the effects of mapping spaces and territories in both cartography and in law,105
legal sociologists and urban studies scholars have further scrutinized the connections between
mapping, scaling, and jurisdictional allocation. The interim result of these endeavors is a rich and
nuanced critique of the connection between scalar and jurisdictional boundary setting on the one
hand and conceptualizations of political representation and legal regulation on the other.106
According to Santos, scale results in transposing one social element into several legal items. A
locally positioned social conflict, for example a case about employment rights and workplace
regulation (such as in Lochner), attains different significance depending on the level (scale) on
which it is being addressed. For the parties on the ground, the conflict is concrete: legal
positions, entitlements, and rights are concretely identified in the dispute, and, likewise, the
context, history, and trajectory of the conflict can be identified. On the national level, however,
the conflict becomes a substantively abstracted version of the concrete, detail-rich conflict as it
occurred on the local level, resulting in a reconfirmation or adaptation of general legal principles.
On a yet higher scale, the original conflict is assessed partly within a web of
management/strategy decisions on the part of the multinational company, whose subsidiary is, or
is associated with, one of the local parties. At the same time, the occurrence of the conflict on the
ground is now seen on the national regulatory level to have indirect, if not direct, relevance for
the understanding of the law governing cases such as that at hand. The law now at issue here is,
in fact, a combination of widely diversified rules in, for example, corporate law, labor and
employment law, the law governing industrial relations, constitutional law, and contract law.
These norms are embedded in different regulatory areas of law, but are all considered part of the
hard core of an official legal regulatory system. But, complementing these legal norms are
numerous soft laws and codes, which emerge from regulatory activities of public-private actors
on a transnational level. Norms governing corporate conduct with regard to employees (as well
as other stakeholders and social or environmental concerns) originate as much from a
(combination of) official hard law as from soft law emanating from a deeply heterarchical,
transnational system, for example, human rights principles for multinational corporations
developed by United Nations agencies,107 codes of conduct developed by international actors
such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), internationally active investment funds such as the California Public
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Employees Retirement System (CALPERS), or best practice guidelines disseminated by
multinationals themselves.
The resulting challenge for lawyers is two fold. One challenge is to understand the
relations between the rules on every scale as interlegality, for example, to view law as resulting
from an interaction of competing and complementing claims of validity on different levels. The
second challenge is to recognize the dynamics between hard and soft law at the heart of each
legal order, a distinction Santos captures by the distinction of center and periphery of law. For
Santos, a legal system evolves, on the one hand, through conceptualizations, interpretative styles
and techniques, and ideologies, which have formed at the core of a legal order due to
institutionalized processes of rule creation and adjudication and are constantly being exported to
the periphery, which is where they are applied in less formalized and institutionalized contexts.
At the periphery, the application of such grounded, conceptualized rules is no longer
straightforward due to the conflict between rules and local customs, practices, understandings,
and routines of law now operating in a “twilight zone.”108 Lawyers must develop a differentiated
response to the fluid states of formalization and institutionalization in this zone. This necessitates
a focus on this intersection of interlegality and legal pluralism, but seeks to push the
methodological investigation further still. In terms of the disembeddedness of contexts of rights
creation, implementation and adjudication in a global context (an arena in which rights are
ascribed to particular actors only with significant difficulty and with elusive effects in terms of
realization and enforcement), the task is to adequately capture the structural dynamics which
mark the interplay of norms, actors, and processes, in view of hopefully contributing to the
development of legal doctrinal elements which are responsive to emerging, legal-political
institutions,109 and to volatile rule-creation processes touching on core concerns of social
regulation.110
A further emphasis in this approach concerns the question how the concept of legal
pluralism111 can be expanded into a conceptual framework through which to address the different
epistemologies that shape legal and political imaginations in the global collision of
rationalities—beyond abyssal thinking.112 This step is vital to the proposal to bridge and bring
into dialogue the sociological discourses on knowledge societies113 and the investigations into
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post-colonial consciousness and imagination114, including the critique of the economics and
politics of post-colonial state sovereignty.115 While the former advance understandings of the farreaching consequences of societal differentiation for conceptualizations of law, the role of the
state and core distinctions such as public/private or state/society in and for the global North,116
the latter open up important vistas on emerging political-discursive cultures117 in the global
South. Scholarship on the global South highlights evolving discourses that seek to resist
universalizing modernization and development narratives originating in the colonial project and
with significant continuities in post-colonial development and good governance agendas of
international political and financial institutions.118 The North’s stigmatizing framing of the South
as savage and backward in contrast to the North’s self-description as coherently ordered,119
provides an important pathway to a detailed assessment of the correlations between evolving
narratives of socio-legal and political consciousness in terms of North/South. The previously
alluded-to parallel readings will focus on these coevolutions of development and transformation
narratives in order to capture the connections that are being established in theories of global
governance between moments in time that are considered to have triggered a particular
development and assessment. A closer inquiry into universalizing, Western assertions of key
moments—e.g. the end of World War II, the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions, the
fall of the Berlin Wall, or September 11th and its aftermath120—lays bare the order-constituting
effects such qualifications have on the conceptualization and consolidation of administered
power relations.121
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The parallel reading and assessment of national and transnational governance discourses
will thus be structured by the employment of norms, actors, and processes on the one hand and
by a critical use of jurisdiction and scale on the other. Mariana Valverde’s attention to
jurisdiction and scale is of great value in this regard. Valverde argues that jurisdiction expresses
law’s governance of social facts and hereby effectively reduces the essential question of
jurisdictions and levels of governance to a matter of competence (sovereignty). As a result, it
tends to obstruct a scrutiny of what acclaim, benefit, and detriment attaches to how elements are
governed. In disputes over institutional competence, the legal challenge is regularly directed at
the level of jurisdiction, far less frequently at the how of governing a particular social
constellation.122
III. TRANSLATION CATEGORIES AND THE GROUNDING OF THEORY THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL
CASE STUDIES
A central contention in this paper has been that categories through which we may hope to
capture the evolving normative and institutional infrastructure of transnational governance can
no longer be developed from within one particular disciplinary framework—such as law,
political science, or sociology. Instead, the categories contemplated here are more general than
categories that are central to individual disciplines such as, for example, law. Categories at the
core of legal theory and doctrine include: laws, legality, rule of law, separation of powers, and
proportionality. These categories have attained their meaning within a particular reference
framework, which—while evolving over time—continues to offer a context of meaning and
embeddedness. The challenge which arises from the case constellations, which lawyers are
confronted with in the context of transnational governance is owed to the fact that this context
cannot be taken for granted or referenced to in an attempt to situate and identify the parties to a
conflict, their interests and stakes, and the avenues available to them to find judicial redress. The
imported conceptions and understandings pertaining to the rule of law, rights, the existence and
roles of a separation of powers system, or access to justice capacities will inevitably collide with
the status such instruments and institutional configurations actually have in a local context.123
Legal anthropologists and legal sociologists conducting ethnographic studies on the nature of
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legal systems in numerous developing countries have been emphasizing the need to
reconceptualize the concepts, frameworks, analytical toolkits, and instruments they meant to
import into legal-economic-political cultures in light of the incompatibility of imported
categories and locally existing structures of legal-social ordering.124 Likewise, law and
development scholars have identified the pitfalls resulting from exporting domestic,
predominantly Western and Northern conceptions of law and the legal system into contexts that
are marked by a different legal tradition.125 Historians and anthropologists have famously
complemented these accounts by introducing the theory of invented traditions, which highlights
the degree to which numerous societal patterns, ordering structures, institutions, and processes
identified as traditional must, in fact, be seen as constructions—as invented traditions—through
acts of labelling and assigning, rather than from an adequate excavation of actually existing and
evolving societal patterns.126
These findings prompt lawyers involved in not only legal aid and law reform projects in
developing countries, but also comparative lawyers to take a second, serious look at their packed
conceptual, analytical, and theoretical luggage with which they embark on projects and
comparisons. While the need to develop a comparative law concept in a direct exchange with the
object of comparison has long been noted,127 the challenge for scholars and practitioners engaged
in legal transplants and law and development projects can now be described in a further
differentiated manner. To the degree that the political and cultural hegemony critique that was
launched against the comparative project128 has by now become quite accepted,129 the
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significance of anthropological insights into the materiality of societal patterns and existing
modes of property transfer, conflict resolution, and rights and claims recognition and
administration,130 has important consequences for law and development and comparative law.
The challenge for these enterprises to understand foreign legal cultures can today be seen in an
even brighter light, illuminating the need to develop an even more responsive and learning
approach to the study of societal ordering mechanisms and foreign legal systems.131 In light of
the just described coalescing of different disciplinary contributions to the study of legal cultures
it appears appropriate to seek for an analytical toolkit to contain instruments and categories,
which are adequate to the emerging interdisciplinary conceptual framework. Such instruments
will be crucial in the study and the understanding of emerging transnational governance
constellations, involving local and foreign, transnational actors, norms, and processes. As a
response to these constellations, the suggestion made here is to conceptualize actors, norms, and
processes as translation categories. Their function would not consist in dismissing the conceptual
heritage of the past through a purportedly new terminological orconceptual architecture. Rather,
these categories—norms, actors, and processes—are meant to both trace the connections and
identify the gaps between existing and emerging conceptualizations of societal change and
regulatory models. These categories allow us to enrich and build on existing disciplinary
narratives: Norms allows us to study, from a historical-comparative perspective, the genealogies
and contestations relating to law, rules, orders, legal pluralism, custom, and social norms. Actors
illuminate the trajectories and conflicts relating to state, society, community, and organization.
An emphasis, lastly, on processes is similar, arguably, to the rich semantic and political history
of contract.132 With the capacity to transcend disciplines, processes illuminate the dynamics of
institutional evolution in the complex interplay of norms and actors today, reflecting
engagement, interaction, contestation, resistance, opposition, and voice. In short, through a focus
on norms, actors, and processes we seek to turn away from the exhaustion of hybrid and singular
disciplinary accounts toward a comprehensive and interdisciplinary research agenda. The
promise of employing these categories lies in their generality and permissiveness to take on
board and make visible actually existing patterns of societal-legal ordering. The distinct
difference to the current state of critically engaging with the challenges of comparative law and
legal transplants133 lies in the introduction of categories that do not claim to carry any preexisting
conceptions of the meaning, scope, and function of law, the public or private nature of rulegenerating institutions, or the legality of the rule-generating and rule-implementing process. As
such, norms, actors, and processes as a triadic concept would be able to capture these dimensions
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(‘law state, and rule of law’) as having evolved within the Western/Northern legal culture, but
the concept suggested here would not be shaped or, more importantly, predetermined by these
dimensions—and, experiences. Instead, norms, actors, and processes would work as excavation
instruments to bring to light those norms, actors, institutions and, processes that actually
constitute a particular legal order.
Relying on this toolkit, the approach sketched here seeks to contribute to a theory and
practice of interdisciplinary research to operationalize these translation categories—norms,
actors, and processes—in complex transnational governance constellations through the use of
case studies. Different than strictly legal cases, the case studies proposed here involve
ethnographic analysis of governance practices in politically and normatively sensitive areas such
as human rights conflicts in the extraction industry, natural resource governance, indigenous
rights, religious identity claims in secular societies, contestation between retroactive and
transitional justice in post-conflict settings, the concept of the rule of law in international
development and state building, transnational private regulatory governance, financial regulation,
and the crucial role of nonstate actors. While transnational governance constellations
increasingly attract a multidisciplinary approach to address legality, legitimacy, and enforcement
concerns, the goal is to scrutinize the ways in which law has not satisfactorily taken up this
interdisciplinary development. A legal theory of global governance should not just borrow from
other disciplines, but contribute to an interdisciplinary governance theory. In that vein, an
examination of how the traditional legal framing of a case selects from facts considered relevant
or irrelevant and ends up too often de-contextualizing the legal case from the underlying
complex societal conflict and regulatory constellation is necessary.134 By focusing on norms,
actors, and processes, these constellations might be grasped through a fresh, genuinely
interdisciplinary lens, making visible manifold competing interests, accounts of power, abilities,
and barriers to the justice system.
The transnational governance case studies envisioned here, including but not limited to
conflicts arising, for example, from multinationals’ operations including mining or large scale
infrastructure construction in developing countries,135 function as laboratories to study
intersecting governance narratives, unfolding in often difficult, power-fraught interactions
between international organizations, private actors, and local interest groups. Such case studies
will be central to the development of context-sensitive and interdisciplinary approaches to
uncover the different dimensions of particular problem constellations or regulatory challenges,
for example in economic and ecological governance or human rights activism.136 Because many
134
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of the concepts used in the case studies are not new but have a significant semantic heritage,137
close attention to historical and contextual detail is a crucial methodological element of the
approach suggested here. While this emphasis on an attention paid to local and historical detail is
inspired by the social history approach, particularly as developed by E.P. Thompson,138 and also
to the scholarship on invented traditions,139 it connects it with the interest of anthropological
ethnographic research in the actual operations of economic, legal, and political actors.140 Such an
approach will allow for a scrutiny of competing assertions of legality/illegality, law/non-law, and
hard/soft law concepts in order to adequately capture the process dynamics which unfold
between different local and transnational actors and norms.
A central contention of this paper has been that the real potential of the identified
translation categories—norms, actors, and processes—lies in the links that they createbetween
known and new cases. In other words, it is crucial to create a connection and dialogue between
cases that lawyers coming out of a particular legal tradition have experienced, registered, and
eventually canonized as hard cases, and as landmark or milestone moments in the development
of the law on the one hand and the struggles to capture the case behind complex social,
economic, cultural, and religious facts found in a transnational governance constellation, on the
other. This dialogue is crucial if one is to avoid the importing of pre-conceptions from a known
legal order into a new, foreign context of legal-regulatory conflict. These patterns of conceptimport can be made visible by revisiting important cases from one’s legal order in an attempt to
extract, in a first step, the lessons that have so far been drawn from a landmark case in order to,
in a second step, revisit these lessons and their adequacy for an adequate understanding of a
conflict and collision of claims and interests in a new transnational context. To illustrate of this
bridge building between landmark cases from one legal culture and the challenges to identify,
construct, and address an emerging case in a transnational governance context is the task of the
following, concluding section of this essay.
IV. WHAT’S IN A CASE? DISEMBEDDING PROBLEM SOLVING: LOCHNER AS CASE IN POINT
The attempt made in this paper to capture the complexity of emerging transnational
governance constellations cannot occur in a vacuum. Instead, the central contention here is that
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there are intriguing ways in which particular cases—seminal or canonical decisions141—have
shaped and continue to influence our assertions of what lies at the core of newly emerging
transnational cases that we are confronted with today. It is in that vein, that the engagement with
such new cases but, more importantly, case studies of conflict constellations, will regularly
unfold against the background of well ‘known’, locally situated, but sometimes globalized case
law,142 considered as having given rise to a legacy, even if the reasons for this status remain a
matter of dispute.143 Such instances of judicial law making are received and canonized as famous
and as hard cases144, having become, over time, contextualized in certain national legal
traditions. Cases demarcating the boundaries between the state and the market, between
assertions of political ‘interventionism’ on the one hand, and ‘private ordering’, on the other, can
be seen as having had played a significant role in the evolution of the Western legal
imagination.145 This background has the effect, that By the time lawyers are demarcating the
boundaries between freedom of contract and state interventionism, between public and private
spheres of authority, or between judicial ‘activism’ and state action in a transnational context, it
does not necessarily become obvious to what degree their perceptions of the existence as well as
of the merit of such distinctions have been shaped by cases from their national legal canon. The
question that is usually not asked in those circumstances is whether and to what degree this
nationally informed conceptual framework146 is adequate or can even be helpful in identifying
the stakes in problem and conflict constellations in a transnational setting.
As suggested in the title to this paper, the the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in
Lochner v. New York is one such case that has had a tremendous influence on the development of
dominant conceptions and, polemics, regarding the challenges of legal governance of market
relations. In other words, cases such as the Lochner decision continue to have an immense
impact on the evolving approaches to the identification of interests and stakes in mostly Western
legal theory and practice of market governance147, while casting a powerful spell over
transnational market governance debates at the same time. Thus, using a case such as Lochner as
a laboratory in which to study the collision of different societal interests, claims to entitlements
and rights on the one hand and the law’s approach to resolving such complex conflicts on the
other, will help us see how emerging transnational governance cases echo a number of Lochner’s
stakes while, at the same time, illustrating how the Lochnerian analytical framework might fall
short of fully capturing the multi-layered dimensions and stakes at the heart of transnational
141
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governance conflicts, while potentially being too focused on well recognized interests and
entitlements within a particular conceptualization of markets, states, and the law. In response, the
purpose of a juxtaposition of landmark cases and their legacies with case studies of emerging
conflict constellations, for example, in developing countries, is to question to what degree our
sensitivity to law’s pitfalls, blindsides, and exclusionary dynamics, as studied through landmark
cases such as Lochner, can and should continue to guide us in the unpacking of hard cases in
transnational governance today.
In other words, what are the lessons to be drawn from an American case from 1905,
which involved a state law setting a maximum number of working hours in bakeries? While both
protagonists and issues at the heart of Lochner have long been seminal to debates over the
boundaries between the state and free markets,148 we have to ask how helpful the particular
framing of the problems identified in Lochner can be for an understanding of what is at stake, for
example, in conflicts between multinational enterprises, their employees and the local
communities in the countries of operation today. Similarly, we must ask how a problem
awareness schooled along the confrontation lines between a private property (business, factory,
or plant) owner or operator and a private employee, as was in the center of Lochner, may guide
us in the identification of interests, vulnerabilities, and entitlements in circumstances, where
already the allegedly private status of the business enterprise in its relation to the host
government, the local authorities, and, oftentimes, the mixed, public-private constituencies of
competing social groups (activists, militia, and social movements) are contested.149
Today, as we revisit this decision’s—multilayered—legacy as a judicial endorsement of
an allegedly unchallenged political-economic theory of freedom of contract,150 as a continuation
of or a break with history,151 or as a bold act of ideologically driven judicial activism,152 we are
facing a dilemma: to whom may we today compare the factory owner opposing the state
legislator? In the current global environment of manifold stand-offs between winners and losers
of globalization,153 whose interests are at stake in such litigations? How are we to identify and
legally qualify, for example, the different interests around large-scale infrastructure,154 or
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extraction projects,155 in developing countries or in precarious political and economic settings?
The urgency of such lines of questionings underscores the need for a methodological approach
that ties current investigations into the nature of legal/nonlegal transnational governance into
continuing developments of local, but increasingly transnational regulatory cultures.
The acknowledgement of Lochner’s disembeddedness and the proposal to recontextualize
its lessons and impact in a transnational context is based on a reconsideration of what has made
this case seminal in an attempt to unpack a different type of lesson to be drawn from such a
landmark case for our conceptualization of transnational legal cases today. I want to suggest, in
contrast to the canonized opposition between Rufus Peckham’s majority opinion and Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr.’s famous dissent,156 that we ought to direct our attention to another part of
the judgment. The question ought to be: What might we discover about Lochner if we attend to
the currently marginalized Harlan dissent, rather than rehearsing current readings of Lochner as
being emblematic of the contestation between state regulation and the free market?157 The reason
for this reorientation follows from the epistemological challenges arising out of complex and
multilayered transnational governance constellations that are marked by a significant degree of
uncertainty and volatility as regards public and private authority, the parties’ access to the justice
system, legal representation, and due process as well as far-reaching challenges regarding the
voice of many substantively invested interest carriers. With these in mind, Harlan’s dissent
appears in a particularly bright light in the way it almost prophetically outlines the future
contours of a process of judicial review unfolding in a fast modernizing, complex soon-tobecome risk society, where it has become common place to scrutinize judicial dependency on
and engagement with expert opinion, altogether unfolding in an always precarious and unstable
separation-of-powers architecture.158 It is this emphasis on the relevance of knowledge as it
generated through a process-driven and competence-conscious undertaking that Harlan
highlights and that bears particular promise for our current efforts in getting the facts right in the
context of complex transnational governance constellations.
Before we can make this leap, however, we need to, at least briefly, review what Harlan
wrote in his dissent. Harlan’s dissenting opinion, thoroughly researched and footnoted, presented
a careful review of the state legislator’s process by which it had rafted the statute in question—
the 1895 New York Bakeshop Act.159 Harlan scrutinized, but did not second-guess the
legislator’s efforts to draw on a wide range of scientific evidence and expert opinion, eventually
coming to a number of conclusions that prompted him to dissent. The first conclusion, upon
reviewing previous case law was that it was “firmly established that what is called the liberty of
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contract may, within certain limits, be subjected to regulations designed and calculated to
promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the public morals or the public
safety.”160 Upon reviewing academic and professional sources outlining possible dangers arising
out of working conditions central to the case before the court, Harlan concluded:
There are many reasons of a weighty, substantial character, based upon the experience of
mankind, in support of the theory that, all things considered, more than ten hours' steady
work each day, from week to week, in a bakery or confectionery establishment, may
endanger the health and shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing their
physical and mental capacity to serve the state and to provide for those dependent upon
them. If such reasons exist that ought to be the end of this case, for the state is not
amenable to the judiciary, in respect of its legislative enactments, unless such enactments
are plainly, palpably, beyond all question, inconsistent with the Constitution of the
United States.161
Against this background, the argument being put forward here that a legal theory of
transnational governance needs to be sensitive to its own ignorance both as regards the
architecture—institutionally and normatively—governing a case in a transnational setting and as
regards the adequate way to determine relevant information on the ground. In other words, in
settings where societal conflicts involve a complex array of public, private, and mixed actors,
precarious and unstable rule of law processes, vulnerable interests and insufficient capacity of
voice,162 the distinction between legally relevant and irrelevant facts becomes one of crucial
significance. It is in this light, that the proposal made here suggests a relaxation of our usually
applied categories to describe legal processes, institutions, rights, and laws and, instead, to
employ categories that might assist in picking up on the institutional and normative dimensions
governing a complex conflict constellation. The idea is to engage with norms, actors, and
processes in the construction of a case in order to show how legal knowledge emanates and
differs from competing accounts of permissible versus illegal conduct and legitimate versus
illegitimate use of power and authority. Approaching such constellations through the proposed
framework of norms, actors, and processes goes beyond the well-known juxtaposition of the
majority opinion’s embrace of a free market ideology in Lochner on one hand and Holmes’s
dissenting refutation of legal formalism on the other. The norms, actors, and processes approach
would, instead, reorient attention to Justice Harlan’s dissent that dwelt on the legislator’s
scientific expertise in conceptualizing workplace regulation and the need for the judiciary to
endorse the allocated regulatory competences in a separation of powers system. Today, Harlan’s
intervention prompts us to problematize and understand the context in which contested rights can
be and are being articulated and legalized. This close attention to otherwise invisible or
neglected interests has been emphasized by anthropologists and law and society scholars alike,
and is today an urgent concern in global South scholarship and activism.163 In search of a legal
theory of global governance, we need to assess the nature, quality, and form of the knowledge
160
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that Harlan addressed to compare it to the knowledge that informs governance decisions in
today’s highly diversified and contested global context.164 In other words, the task consists of
emphasizing the nature and evolution of epistemology and knowledge in the formation of
national and emerging global regulatory constellations.165 This allows us to trace the impact of
particular, influential national and local regulatory assertions of a transformation of the state on
regulatory governance models on a global scale.166 But rather than taking a waning state
narrative as blueprint for a global free market society, the challenge is to scrutinize the complex
and contested role of the state in a knowledge society167 to identify its growing dependency on
societal knowledge and input. Contrasting this transformation of the epistemological basis of
contemporary Western governance structures with Southern epistemologies and experiences with
state formation and rights consolidation,168 is central to such an undertaking. At the same time,
and equally central, this approach seeks to resist universalizing modernization narratives.169
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